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Physical Layer Security of TAS/MRC Over κ-µ
Shadowed Fading Channel
José David Vega Sánchez, D. P. Moya Osorio, F. Javier López-Martínez, Martha Cecilia Paredes Paredes, and
Luis Urquiza-Aguiar
Abstract—This paper investigates the impact on the achievable
secrecy performance of multiple-input multiple-output systems
by dealing with realistic propagation conditions. Specifically, we
focus on the κ-µ shadowing fading model, which has proven
to be more accurate in characterizing mm-wave scenarios than
traditional Rice and Rayleigh ones. By considering transmit
antenna selection and maximal ratio combining at the receiver
ends, we study two different scenarios, namely: (i) the trans-
mitter has knowledge of the channel state information (CSI) of
the eavesdropper link, and (ii) the transmitter does not know
eavesdropper’s CSI. Based on these assumptions, we derive novel
analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
and the average secrecy capacity (ASC) to assess the secrecy
performance in passive and active eavesdropping scenarios,
respectively. Moreover, we develop analytical asymptotic expres-
sions of the SOP and ASC at high signal-to-noise ratio regime.
Some useful insights on how to obtain noticeable improvements
in the secrecy performance are also provided.
Index Terms—κ-µ fading model, generalized fading channels,
maximal ratio combining, mm-Wave, physical layer security,
transmit antenna selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
RADITIONALLY, security systems are based on higher
layer cryptographic mechanisms, which contemplate
mathematically complex algorithms that demand a high con-
sumption of energy and computational resources. Such meth-
ods pose great challenges for their implementation and man-
agement for the fifth-generation (5G) networks in practice.
Therefore, the cryptography by itself does not constitute an
integral solution to the security problems envisioned for future
wireless transmissions. In this sense, physical layer security
(PLS) arises to provide secure communications in the phys-
ical layer by smartly exploiting the impairments (e.g., noise,
interference, and fading) of the wireless channel [1]. Shannon
introduced the first notions of PLS from the information-
theoretical context in his pioneering work in [2]. Later, the
so-called wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner in [3].
Subsequently, Wyner’s results were extended for the broadcast
channel in [4] and for the Gaussian channel in [5], where it
was shown that the secrecy capacity is equal to the difference
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between the capacities of the main channel and the wiretap
channel.
Based on the mentioned results, the keys concepts con-
cerning the generalization of the wiretap channel to multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) channels were investigated
in [6, 7]. These works have inspired various research activities
to improve the secrecy in different MIMO topologies. For
instance, the utilization of artificial noise (AN) for MIMO
schemes to enhance the PLS performance was analyzed in [8].
Relevant papers on the impact of cooperative communications
on secrecy capacity for MIMO wiretap systems were studied
in [10, 20]. In [11], the researches focused on the secrecy
performance of cognitive MIMO relaying networks. On the
other hand, in order to achieve higher secrecy capacities,
different beamforming schemes were considered in [12–14].
Nevertheless, due to which the complexity in obtaining the
channel state information (CSI) is proportional to the number
of antennas in the system, these beamforming methods require
the use of advanced signal processing algorithms, resulting
in high computational consumption. Alternatively, optimal
antenna selection at the transmitter only requires a single
radio-frequency (RF) chain compared to the full CSI required
in beamforming schemes [15]. From a secrecy perspective,
since transmit antenna selection (TAS) provides full transmit
diversity, it has been adopted to enhance secrecy performance
at low-cost and complexity. Therefore, many research studies
have addressed their efforts to investigate TAS in the context of
PLS. Among them, in [16, 17] and [18, 19] the authors inves-
tigated the PLS metrics of TAS in maximal ratio combining
(MRC) receivers undergo Rayleigh and Nakagami-m fading
channels, respectively. Readers can refer to [20, 21] (and
references therein) for guidance about secrecy performance in
TAS/MRC systems. Very recently, in [22–24], the researchers
examined the secrecy performance in MIMO wiretap channels
over generalized fading conditions (i.e., α-µ, and η-µ fading
models).
However, the fading channels considered in the aforemen-
tioned works have proven to be inaccurate to characterize
the propagation medium of the 5G scenarios in practice.
To circumvent this issue, generalized and versatile channel
models such as Fluctuating Two-Ray (FTR) [25], and the κ-
µ shadowed [26], have been proposed in the last years. Such
models rely on the assumption in that dominant components
are subject to random fluctuations (also known as shadowing).
Based on this channel feature, the κ-µ shadowing fading model
finds great applicability in a range of real-world applications
such as device-to-device (D2D) communications, underwater
2acoustic communications (UAC), body-centric fading chan-
nels, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems, land mobile
satellite (LMS), etc [27]. In the context of PLS, in [28, 29], the
authors investigated the secrecy metrics over the two fading
models above referenced in single-input single-output (SISO)
wiretap channels. Nevertheless, the secrecy performance over
κ-µ shadowed channel model in MIMO systems is still un-
explored. Our goal is to investigate the impact of multiple
antennas on the secrecy performance over κ-µ shadowed
fading channels. In light of the above considerations, the main
takeaways of our work are as follows:
• Novel closed-form expressions for the probability density
function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the maximum of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) κ-µ shadowed random variables (RVs)
associated with the legitimate links are derived.
• Assuming that the transmitter is not aware of the CSI of
the wiretap path, we derive exact closed-form expressions
for the secrecy outage probability (SOP). We also provide
closed-form expressions for the average secrecy rate
(ASC) by assuming that the CSI of the eavesdropper
path is available at the transmitter. Both secrecy metrics
are developed in TAS/MRC systems under κ-µ shadowed
fading channels.
• Simple asymptotic expressions for the SOP in the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime are obtained. Based
on these formulations, we provide some useful insights
of the impact of the system parameters (i.e., numbers of
antennas and fading parameters) on the PLS performance.
In addition, asymptotic expressions for the ASC are
derived.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the system and channel models and a
framework that addresses the PDF y CDF of the maximum
of i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed RVs. Section III derives closed-form
expressions for the SOP and the asymptotic behaviour of the
SOP over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed fading channels. Section IV
presents analytical expressions for the ASC, based on which
formulations for the asymptotic ASC are also obtained. Section
V shows illustrative numerical results and discussions. Finally,
concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
Notation: Throughout this paper, f(Z)(z) and F(Z)(z) de-
note the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of a RV Z; E [·], expectation;
Pr {·}, probability; |·|, the absolute value; ≃, “asymptotically
equal to”; ≈, “approximately equal to”. In addition, Γ(·),
denotes the gamma function [36, Eq. (6.1.1)]; C, the Euler’s
constant [35, Eq. (8.367.1)]; e, the exponential constant [35,
Eq. (0.245.1)]; γ(·, ·), the lower incomplete gamma func-
tion [36, Eq. (6.5.2)]; Γ(·, ·), the upper incomplete gamma
function [36, Eq. (6.5.3)]; 2F1 (·, ·; ·; ·), the hypergeometric
function [36, Eq. (15.1.1)]; and 1F1 (·, ·, ·), the confluent
hypergeometric function [36, Eq. (13.1.3)].
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
A. System Model
We consider the classic three-node model, where a source
node Alice (A) sends confidential information to a legitimate
destination node Bob (B), while an eavesdropper Eve (E)
attempts to intercept this information through the eavesdropper
channel, as illustrated in Fig. 1. All the nodes i.e., the trans-
mitter, the receiver and the eavesdropper, are equipped with
multiple antennas denoted by NA, NB, and NE, respectively.
Also, it is assumed that both the main and eavesdropper
channels are subject i.i.d. quasi-static κ-µ shadowed fading.
The PDF and CDF of the instantaneous SNR of the RV γ
following κ-µ shadowed fading can be expressed as a finite
mixture of gamma distributions as given in [30]1 by
• If m < µ
fγ(γ) =
µ−m∑
j=1
A1,jf
G
γ (ωA1;µ−m− j + 1; γ)
+
m∑
j=1
A2,jf
G
γ (ωA2;m− j + 1; γ) , (1a)
Fγ(γ) =1−
µ−m∑
j=1
A1,j exp
(
− γ
∆1
) µ−m−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γ
∆1
)r
−
m∑
j=1
A2,j exp
(
− γ
∆2
)m−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γ
∆2
)r
, (1b)
• If m ≥ µ
fγ(γ) =
m−µ∑
j=0
Bjf
G
γ (ωB;m− j; γ) , (2a)
Fγ(γ) =1−
m−µ∑
j=0
Bj exp
(
− γ
∆2
)m−j−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γ
∆2
)r
, (2b)
where fGX (γ; m˜;x) denotes the PDF of a RV x following a
gamma distribution, defined as
fGX (γ; m˜;x) =
(
m˜
γ
)m˜
xm˜−1
(m˜− 1)! exp
(
−xm˜
γ
)
, (3)
1Currently, the PDF and CDF of the κ-µ shadowed distribution can be
represented by (i) hypergeometric functions as proposed in its original
formats [26]; (ii) a series in terms of Laguerre polynomials [27], and (iii)
an infinite [31] and finite [30] mixture of gamma distributions. In this work,
we chose the last one because of its mathematically treatable expressions in
dealing with TAS/MRC systems.
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Fig. 1. A TAS/MRC in a MIMO network consisting of a legitimate pair and
one eavesdropper, where the transmitter Alice (A), the receiver Bob (B), and
the eavesdropper Eve (E) are equipped with NA, NB, and NE antennas,
respectively.
and where
A1,j =(−1)m
(
m+ j − 2
j − 1
)(
m
µκ+m
)m(
µκ
µκ+m
)−m−j+1
,
A2,j =(−1)j−1
(
µ−m+ j − 2
j − 1
)
×
(
m
µκ+m
)j−1(
µκ
µκ+m
)m−µ−j+1
,
Bj =
(
m− µ
j
)(
m
µκ+m
)j (
µκ
µκ+m
)m−µ−j
, (4)
and
ωA1 =∆1 (µ−m− j + 1) ,
ωA2 =∆2 (m− j + 1) ,
ωB =∆2 (m− j) , (5)
with
∆1 =
γ
µ (1 + κ)
,
∆2 =
µκ+m
m
γ
µ (1 + κ)
, (6)
in which γ = E [γ] is the average SNR, µ, m, and κ are
the fading parameters that denote the number of the multipath
clusters, the shadowing severity index, and the ratio between
the total power of the dominant components and the total
power of the scattered waves when µ is a natural number,
respectively.
In our MIMO wiretap system, the optimum TAS protocol
selects the strongest antenna which maximizes the instanta-
neous SNR between Alice and Bob for transmission. From
a secrecy perspective, this fact is beneficial as it maximizes
channel capacity and fully exploits the multi-antenna diversity
at the transmitter. Nevertheless, on the eavesdropper’s channel
side, the optimum TAS for Bob corresponds to a random
transmit antenna for Eve. Also, in order to maximize the
instantaneous SNRs at the receiver ends as well, we consider
the MRC diversity combining technique to be employed at
both Bob and Eve. The index of the selected antenna at the
transmitter, denoted by k∗, is determined by
k∗ = arg max
1≤k≤NA
NB∑
l=1
|hk,l|2 , (7)
where hk,l is the channel coefficient of the link between k-th
transmitting antenna at Alice and l-th receiving antenna at Bob.
Also, through a feedback channel, the value of k∗ is available
to the transmitter. Under TAS/MRC setup, the received signals
at the l-th antenna of Bob and at the r-th (1 ≤ r ≤ NE)
antenna of Eve can be formulated as
yB,l =
√
Phk∗,lx+ nl, (8a)
yE,r =
√
Pgk∗,rx+ nr, (8b)
where P is the transmit power per antenna, x denotes the se-
cret message to be transmitted, hk∗,l is the channel coefficients
of the link between the selected antenna, k∗, at Alice and the
l-th receiving antenna at Bob. Likewise, gk∗,r is the channel
coefficient of the link between the selected antenna, k∗, at
Alice and the r-th receiving antenna at Eve. Also, nl and nr
are additive white complex Gaussian noise at the receivers of
the l-th antenna of Bob and at the r-th antenna of Eve with
zero mean and variance σ2w , w ∈ {B,E}, respectively. Based
on (8), the corresponding instantaneous SNRs at the receivers
can be expressed as
γB =
P
∑NB
l=1 |hk∗,l|2
σ2B
, (9a)
γE =
P
∑NE
r=1 |gk∗,r|2
σ2E
. (9b)
B. Channel Statistics
In this section, we present the theoretical background con-
cerning the statistics of the main and eavesdropper channels
to facilitate the secrecy analysis in the next sections.
Let γk∗,r =
P |gk∗,r|2
σ2
E
be the instantaneous received SNR of
the r-th diversity branch of the MRC receiver at Eve. Now,
by considering NE i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed RVs, i.e., γk∗,r ∼
(γE, κE, µE,mE) for r = {1, . . . , NE}, the sum of the RV
γE is another κ-µ shadowed RV with scaled parameters,
i.e., γE ∼ (NEγE, κE, NEµE, NEmE) [26, Proposition 1].
Therefore, from (9b) the corresponding PDF and CDF at Eve
are given by
• If mE < µE
fγE(γE) =
ηE∑
j=1
AE1,jfG
(
ωEA1; ηE − j + 1; γE
)
+
νE∑
j=1
AE2,jfG
(
ωEA2; νE − j + 1; γE
)
, (10a)
4FγE(γE) =1−
ηE∑
j=1
AE1,j exp
(
− γE
∆E1
) ηE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γE
∆E1
)r
−
νE∑
j=1
AE2,j exp
(
− γE
∆E2
) νE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γE
∆E2
)r
,
(10b)
where ηE = NE(µE −mE), and νE = NEmE.
• If mE ≥ µE
fγE(γE) =
βE∑
j=0
BEj fG
(
ωEB; νE − j; γE
)
, (11a)
FγE(γE) =1−
βE∑
j=0
BEj exp
(
− γE
∆E2
) νE−j−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
γE
∆E2
)r
,
(11b)
where βE = NE(mE − µE). For notational convenience, all
the coefficients marked with superscripts E (e.g., ∆E1 ) refer to
the fading parameters at Eve, which can be obtained from (4)
to (6) by substituting γ → NEγE, µ→ NEµE, m→ NEmE,
and κ→ κE.
Now, let γk∗,l =
P |hk∗,l|2
σ2
B
be the instantaneous received
SNR of the l-th diversity branch of the MRC receiver at
Bob, the CDF and PDF of γB =
∑NB
l=1 γk∗,l are given in
the following propositions.
Proposition 1. The CDF of γB is given by
• If mB < µB
FγB(γB) =1 +
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !
×

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z


pq
× exp
(
−γB
(
h−k
∆B
1
)) ∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !
×

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z


st
× exp
(
−γB
(
k
∆B
2
))
γ
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
B ,
(12)
where ηB = NB(µB −mB), νB = NBmB. Likewise as in the
previous case, all the coefficients marked with superscripts
B (e.g., ∆B1 ) refer to the fading parameters at Bob, which
can be obtained from (4) to (6) by substituting γ → NBγB,
µ → NBµB, m → NBmB, and κ → κB. Also, based on the
multinomial theorem [36, Eq. (24.1.2)], ρ (h− k, ηB) =
{(s1, s2, · · · , sηB) : st ∈ N,
∑ηB
t=1 st = h− k}, and
ρ (k, νB) =
{
(p1, p2, · · · , pνB) : pq ∈ N,
∑νB
q=1 pq = k
}
.
• If mB ≥ µB
FγB(γB) =1 +
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
× exp
(
−γB
(
h
∆B
2
))
γ
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st
B , (13)
where βB = NB(mB − µB), and ρ (h, νB) =
{(s1, s2, · · · , sνB) : st ∈ N,
∑νB
t=1 st = h}.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2. From (12) and (13), the PDFs of γB can be
obtained as
• If mB < µB
fγB(γB) =
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !
×

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z


pq
×
exp
(
−γB
(
h−k
∆B
1
+ k
∆B
2
))
∆B1∆
B
2
∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !
×

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z


st
× γ−1+
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
B
×
(
∆B1∆
B
2
(
ηB∑
t=1
(ηB − t)st +
νB∑
q=1
(νB − q)pq
)
− γB
(
∆B1 k −∆B2 (k − h)
))
. (14)
• If mB ≥ µB
fγB(γB) =
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
×
exp
(
−hγB
∆B
2
)
∆B2
γ
−1+
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st
B
×
(
∆B2
νB∑
t=1
(νB − t)st − hγB
)
. (15)
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Exact SOP Analysis
Here, we consider a silent eavesdropper, in which its chan-
nel state information (CSI) is not available at Alice. Therefore,
5Alice selects a constant secrecy rate RS to transmit messages
to Bob. In practical networks, this setup is well known as a
passive eavesdropping scenario. The secrecy capacity CS is
defined as [3]
CS =max {CB − CE, 0} , (16)
in which CB = log2(1 + γB) and CE = log2(1 + γE) are the
capacities of the main and eavesdropper channels, respectively.
Note that secrecy can be guaranteed, only if RS ≤ CS, and is
compromised otherwise. Thus, in this scenario, the SOP is a
useful performance metric for measuring information leakage.
The SOP is defined as the probability that the instantaneous
CS falls below a predefined target secrecy rate RS. The SOP
can be formulated as [32]
SOP = Pr {CS (γB, γE) < RS}
= Pr {γB < τγE + τ − 1}
=
∫ ∞
0
FγB (τγE + τ − 1) fγE(γE)dγE. (17)
where τ
∆
= 2RS .
Proposition 3. The SOP for mi < µi and mi ≥ µi with
i ∈ {B,E} over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed fading channels can be
obtained as (19) and (20), respectively, at the top of the next
page.
Proof. See Appendix B.
From (17), a high SNR approximation of the SOP, defined
as SOPA can be expressed as
SOPA = Pr {γB < τγE} ≤ SOP. (18)
B. Asymptotic SOP
In this section, we focus in developing asymptotic SOP
closed-form expressions in the high-SNR regime to gain more
insights into the behavior of the fading parameters in the
system performance. Here, we consider the scenario where
γB → ∞ while γE is kept fixed, i.e., the case in which
A is very close to B and E is located far away. Our aim
is to express the asymptotic SOP expression in the form
SOP∞ ≈ Gcγ−GdB [33], where Gc and Gd represent the
secrecy array gain and the secrecy diversity gain, respectively.
Next, the asymptotic SOP expression over κ-µ shadowed
fading channels is given in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. The asymptotic closed-form expression of the
SOP over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed can be obtained as (21), at the
top of the next page.
Proof. See Appendix C.
From (21), note that the secrecy diversity gain is given by
Gc = NANBµB, which only depends on both the antenna
settings and the fading parameter related to the legitimate
channel. In other words, this means that the secrecy diver-
sity gain is directly affected by varying either the number
of antennas (i.e., NA and/or NB) or the number of wave
clusters arriving at Bob. This fact plays a pivotal role in the
secrecy performance of the system (as will be discussed in
Section V). On the other hand, notice that fading parameter µE
corresponding to the eavesdropper channel does not affect the
secrecy diversity gain of the underlying system (vide Fig. 5).
IV. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
In this section, we consider the active eavesdropping sce-
nario, where the CSI of both the main channel and the
eavesdropper channel are known at Alice. In such a case,
unlike the passive eavesdropping scenario, Alice can adapt
the achievable secrecy rate RS such that RS ≤ CS. Here,
the maximum achievable secrecy rate occurs when RS = CS.
Since the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is available at Alice,
the average secrecy capacity is an essential performance metric
to assess the secrecy performance.
A. Exact ASC
According to [32], the ASC, C¯S, is defined as the average
of the secrecy rate over the instantaneous SNR of the main
channel and eavesdropper channels. Therefore, C¯S can be
formulated as [23, Proposition 3]
C¯S = C¯B − L (γB, γE) , (27)
where C¯B is the average capacity of the main link, given by
C¯B =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− FγB(γE)
1 + γE
dγE, (28)
and L (γB, γE) can be interpreted as ASC loss, defined as
L (γB, γE) =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
F¯γE(γE)F¯γB(γE)
1 + γE
dγE, (29)
in which F¯γB and F¯γE denote the complementary CDF
(CCDF) of the RV γB, and γE, respectively. Then, the ASC
expressions over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed fading channels in a
TAS/MRC system are given as follows.
Proposition 5. The ASC closed-form expressions for mi ≥ µi
and mi < µi with i ∈ {B,E} over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed fading
channels can be formulated as (22), and (23), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix D.
B. Asymptotic ASC
In this section, we concentrate our attention on deriving
closed-form asymptotic ASC expressions to assess the sys-
tem performance in the high SNR regime. Here, as in the
asymptotic SOP analysis, we consider that γB goes to infinity,
while γB is kept unchanged. Based on this, the asymptotic
expression of the ASC can be expressed as [23]
C¯∞S ≃ C¯γB→∞B − C¯E, (30)
where the average capacity of the eavesdropper channel, C¯E,
is given by [23]
C¯E =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1− FγE(γE)
1 + γE
dγE, (31)
Proposition 6. The asymptotic expressions of ASC for mi <
µi and mi ≥ µi with i ∈ {B,E} over i.i.d. κ-µ shadowed
6SOP =
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SOP∞ ≃
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NBµB µNBµB−1B τ
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. (21)
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fading channels are given in (24) and (25), respectively. Here,
U(u) and W(w) can be computed from (26).
Proof. See Appendix E.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we provide some numerical results along
with Monte Carlo simulation to assess the proposed analytical
derivations. In all plots, it is considered that the fading severity
parameters (i.e., µi and mi for i ∈ {B,E}) take integer
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values2. Also, in all figures, the markers denote the Monte
2These assumptions can be justified for the following reasons: (i) The shape
parameter µB,E was originally defined in the κ-µ distribution as the number
of clusters of multipath waves propagating in a certain environment [34].
So, as asserted in [34], the consideration that the parameters, µB,E to take
integer values is related to the physical model for the κ-µ distribution; and
(ii) In practice, the impact of restricting the fading parameter mB,E to
take integer values is negligible in severe shadowing environments (i.e., low
values of mB,E). Also, for light shadowing scenarios (i.e., high values of
mB,E), the impact of constraining mB,E to take integer values is even more
negligible [30].
Carlo simulations.
In Fig. 2, we compare the SOP as a function of γB for
different numbers of transmit antennas, NA, and unchanged
number of receiving antennas, NB = NE = 2. For this case,
the corresponding setting parameters are given by: RS = 1
bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, µi = 2, κi = 2, and mi = 3 for i ∈
{B,E}. Note that in all instances, our analytical curves are
perfectly matched with the Monte Carlo simulations. Here, our
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−
(
hNBγB
∆B
2
)−(∑νBt=1(νB−t)st)
Γ (
∑νB
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(26)
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Fig. 2. SOP vs. γB, for various numbers of transmit antennas, NA, and fixed
number of receiving antennas, NB = NE = 2. For all curves, the setting
parameter values are: RS = 1 bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, µi = 2, κi = 2, and
mi = 3 for i ∈ {B,E}. The markers denote Monte Carlo simulations.
goals is to analize the secrecy diversity gain of the legitimate
channels for the considered cases. So, based on the asymptotic
plots, we see that the antenna configuration at Alice is one of
the factors that clearly contributes in the slope of the SOP in
a proportional way. On one hand, this means that the drop of
the SOP is more steep (i.e., better secrecy performance) as the
number of transmit antennas increases. On the other hand, as
the transmit antennas decreases the SOP is impaired and the
drop is not so pronounced. These facts are in coherence with
the results obtained in the Gd expression.
Fig. 3 presents the SOP vs. γB for various numbers of
receiving antennas, NE, and fixed number antennas, NA =
NB = 2. The remainder parameters are set to: RS = 1 bps/Hz,
γE = 8 dB, µi = 3, and κi = 5, for i ∈ {B,E}. In this sce-
nario, we explore the impact of having light (mB = mE = 10)
or heavy (mB = mE = 1) shadowing for the line-of-sight
(LOS) components at both Bob and Eve in an environment
with multiple antennas. From all traces, we can see that com-
bining mild shadowing in the LOS components with a reduced
number of antennas at Eve is more beneficial for the secrecy
performance, as expected. Conversely, if the shadowing is
heavy, a large number of antennas at the eavesdropper always
lead to lower secrecy performance.
In Fig. 4, we evaluate the SOP as a function of γB,
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Fig. 3. SOP vs. γB, for various numbers of receiving antennas, NE, and
fixed number antennas, NA = NB = 2. For all plots, the setting parameter
values are: RS = 1 bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, µi = 3, and κi = 5, for i ∈ {B,E}.
The markers denote Monte Carlo simulations, whereas the solid and dash-dot
lines represent analytical solutions.
considering different numbers of receiving antennas, NB, and
fixed number of antennas NA = NE = 2. For all instances,
the configuration parameters are as follows: RS = 2 bps/Hz,
γE = 8 dB, µi = 1, and mi = 2 for i ∈ {B,E}. In this
scenario, we consider small (κB = κE = 1.5) and large
(κB = κE = 10) LOS components in the received wave
clusters for a different number of antennas at Bob. It can be
observed that, if the increase in the number of Bob’s antennas
is accompanied by strong LOS components (κB = κE = 10),
the secrecy diversity gain increases, resulting in a noticeable
improvement in the secrecy performance. This result is linked
to the fact that NB directly influences the slope of the SOP, as
shown in Gd formulation. However, in the opposite scenario
(wherein both NB and κi for i ∈ {B,E} decrease), we note
that the SOP performance deteriorates.
Fig. 5 shows the SOP vs γB, for NA = NB = 2,
NE = 3, and different received wave clusters, µB, and µE.
The remainder parameters are set to: RS = 2 bps/Hz, γE = 8
dB, κi = 4, and mi = 5 for i ∈ {B,E}. In the proposed
scenarios, we investigate the influence of the number of wave
clusters at the receiver ends on the secrecy performance. We
consider the following two cases: (i) µE is kept fixed, whereas
µB goes from 2 to 5; (ii) µB is kept unchanged, whereas µE
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Fig. 4. SOP vs. γB, for different numbers of receiving antennas, NB, and
unchanged number of: (i) receiving antennas, NE = 2, and (ii) transmit
antennas, NA = 2. For all curves, the setting parameter values are: RS
= 2 bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, µi = 1, and mi = 2 for i ∈ {B,E}. The
markers denote Monte Carlo simulations, whereas the solid and dash-dot lines
represent analytical solutions.
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Fig. 5. SOP vs. γB, for NA = NB = 2, NE = 3, and different received
wave clusters, µB, and µE . Also, for all plots, the setting parameter values
are: RS = 2 bps/Hz, γE = 8 dB, κi = 4, and mi = 5 for i ∈ {B,E}. The
solid and dash-dot lines represent analytical solutions.
goes from 2 to 5. In the former case, we note that the secrecy
diversity order varies at the rate of the µB. For instance, as
µB increases, the secrecy performance improves. In the latter
case, it is observed that as µE increases, the slope of the SOP
remains identical. This fact corroborates our finding (vide Gd
expression) that the secrecy diversity gain of the system is
not affected by the number of received wave clusters at Eve.
From a secrecy perspective, this result is a valuable insight for
design and implementation criteria to be used in future mobile
networks.
Fig. 6 depicts the ASC performance vs. γB, for different
numbers of transmit antennas, NA, and fixed number of
antennas, NB = NE = 3. The remainder parameters are set to:
γE = 8 dB, number of clusters µi = 2 with high fluctuation
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Fig. 6. ASC vs. γB, for different numbers of transmit antennas, NA, and
fixed number of receiving antennas, NB = NE = 3. For all plots, the
corresponding parameter values are: γE = 8 dB, µi = 2, mi = 1, and
κi = 5 for i ∈ {B,E}. The markers denote Monte Carlo simulations.
mi = 1, and LOS environments κi = 5 for i ∈ {B,E}.
From all figures, it is straightforward to see that increasing
NA implies increasing C¯S. However, for these cases, having
more number of antennas at the transmitter does not reflect
a noticeable improvement in terms of C¯S, because the LOS
fluctuation is severe.
Next, Fig. 7 shows the ASC as a function of γB, considering
different numbers of receiving antennas,NB, and fixed number
of antennas, NA = NE = 2. The remainder parameters are set
to: γE = 8 dB, and µi = mi = 2 for i ∈ {B,E}. It can
be noted that the C¯S is clearly not affected by increasing the
power of the LOS components (i.e., κi = 1.5 to κi = 10
for i ∈ {B,E}). This inference does not apply in the
previous cases, where an increase in the power of the LOS
is obviously favorable for the SOP and consequently for the
C¯S. We can explain this observation because if µi = mi (for
i ∈ {B,E}) implies that both the scattering and the shadowed
LOS components in each cluster experience the same fading.
Therefore, C¯S is independent of κi. However, this channel
behavior changes when mi ≥ µi or mi < µi (for i ∈ {B,E}).
In addition, in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, it can be noted that the
asymptotic ASC curves tightly approximate the Monte Carlo
simulations in the high SNR regime.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the impact on the PLS performance of
MIMO wiretap systems by assuming a versatile channel model
ranging from strong LOS to weak LOS, from light to heavy
shadowing for the LOS components, and from homogeneous
diffuse scattering to scenarios which foster the clustering
of scattered multipath waves. We have provided numerical
results that reveal that large LOS components (κi for), weak
shadowing environment (mi for i ∈ {B,E}), rich scattering
condition at the intended receiver (µB), and multiple antennas
at the legitimate users collectively lead to improve the secrecy
performance. Furthermore, it has been shown that impact in
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Fig. 7. ASC vs. γB, for different numbers of receiving antennas, NB, and
fixed number of antennas, NA = NE = 2. For all plots, the corresponding
parameter values are: γE = 8 dB, and µi = mi = 2 for i ∈ {B,E}. The
markers denote Monte Carlo simulations, whereas the solid and dash-dot lines
represent analytical solutions.
the increase on the number of wave clusters arriving at Eve is
negligible from a secrecy perspective.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Using (5) into γB =
∑NB
l=1 γk∗,l, the CDF of γB can be
formulated as
FγB(γB) =
(
Fγ1(γB)
)NA
, (32)
where γ1 =
∑NB
l=1 γk,l with γk,l denoting the instantaneous
received SNR of the link between a single transmitting k
antenna at Alice and l-th receiving antenna at Bob. In dealing
with i.i.d. channels, the CDF of γ1 can be obtained by
following the same methodology used for (10), and (11),
i.e., γ1 ∼ (NBγB, κB, NBµB, NBmB). However, the resulting
CDFs of γ1
3 become intractable in developing (32), if not
impossible. Therefore, we propose to reformulate such CDFs
of γ1 from its original forms to equivalent expressions by
changing the indices of the sums and rearranging some of
the terms, so we obtain
• If mB < µB
Fγ1(γB) =1−
ηB∑
j=1
(
γB
∆B
1
)ηB−j exp(− γB
∆B
1
)
(ηB−j)!
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−j
AB1,ηB+1−z
−
νB∑
j=1
(
γB
∆B
2
)νB−j exp(− γB
∆B
2
)
(νB−j)!
ν∑
z=ν+1−j
AB2,νB+1−z,
(33)
where ηB = NB(µB −mB), and νB = NBmB.
3The resulting CDFs of γ1 refer to (10b) and (11b) by changing all the
subscripts E by B.
• If mB ≥ µB
Fγ1(γB) =1−
νB−1∑
j=0
(
γB
∆B
2
)νB−1−j exp(− γB
∆B
2
)
(νB−1−j)!
×
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j)
BBβB−z, (34)
where βB = NB(mB − µB),the coefficients marked with su-
perscripts B (e.g., ∆B1 ) are associated to the fading parameters
at Bob, and
T (j) =
{
j + 1, for 0 ≤ j ≤ βB
βB + 1, otherwise.
In both (33) and (34), the respective coefficients can be ob-
tained from (4) to (6) by substituting γ → NBγB, µ→ NBµB,
m→ NBmB, and κ→ κB.
In what follows, we derive the CDF of γB for mB < µB
and mB ≥ µB.
• If mB < µB
Substituting (33) into (32) and by applying the binomial
expansion twice [35, Eq. (1.111)], we get
FγB(γB) =
NA∑
h=0
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
)( ηB∑
j=1
(
γB
∆B
1
)ηB−j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
×
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(
−
γB
∆B
1
)
(ηB−j)!
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−j
AB1,ηB+1−z
)h−k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
(
νB∑
j=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
×
(
γB
∆B
2
)νB−j exp(− γB
∆B
2
)
(νB−j)!
ν∑
z=νB+1−j
AB2,νB+1−z
)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
.
(35)
Next, by invoking the multinomial theorem [36, Eq. (24.1.2)]
for both terms T1 and T2, and after some mathematical
manipulations, the CDF of γB can be formulated as in (12),
which concludes the proof.
• If mB ≥ µB
Replacing (34) into (32) and by applying the binomial expan-
sion [35, Eq. (1.111)], it follows that
FγB(γB) =
NA∑
h=0
(−1)h
(
NA
h
)( νB∑
j=1
(
γB
∆B
2
)νB−j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
×
exp
(
−
γB
∆B
2
)
(νB−j)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z
)h
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
. (36)
Again, by using the multinomial expansion [36, Eq. (24.1.2)]
into T3, and after some algebraic manipulations, the CDF of
γB can be expressed as in (13). This completes the the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 3
A. SOP
• If mi < µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Substituting (12) and (10a) into (17), we can obtain
SOP =
NA∑
h=0
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !
×

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z


st
×
∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
×
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z
)pq]
exp
(
− (τ−1)(h−k)
∆B
1
)
× exp
(
− (τ−1)k
∆B
2
)[ ηE∑
j=1
AE
1,j
(ηE−j)!
(
ηE−j+1
ωEA1
)ηE−j+1
×
∫ ∞
0
(τγE + τ − 1)
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
× γηE−jE exp
(
−γE
(
τ(h−k)
∆B
1
+ τk
∆B
2
+ ηE−j+1
ωEA1
))
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
νE∑
j=1
AE
2,j
(νE−j)!
(
νE−j+1
ωEA2
)νE−j+1 ∫ ∞
0
γνE−jE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
× (τγE + τ − 1)
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
× exp
(
−γE
(
τ(h−k)
∆B
1
+ τk
∆B
2
+ νE−j+1
ωEA1
))
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
]
.
(37)
Here, with the aid of [35, Eq. (1.111) - Eq. (3.351.2)] to
solve both I1 and I2, the respective SOP can be expressed as
in (19), which concludes the proof.
• If mi ≥ µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Substituting (13) and (11a) into (17), we get
SOP =
NA∑
h=0
(−1)h
(
NA
h
)
exp
(
−h (τ−1)
∆B
2
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
×
βE∑
j=0
BEj
νE−j−1
(
νE−j
ωEB
)νE−j ∫ ∞
0
γνE−j−1E exp
(
− γEhτ
∆B
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
× (τγE + τ − 1)
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st exp
(
−γE
(
νE−j
ωEB
))
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(38)
Again, by using [35, Eq. (1.111) - Eq. (3.351.2)] to solve I3,
the SOP can be formulated as in (20). This concludes the
proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
A. SOP∞
1) Keeping γE Fixed and γB →∞ : Firstly, by using the
asymptotic-matching method proposed in [37], the CDF of a
κ-µ shadowed RV given in (1b) and (2b) can be approximated
by a gamma distribution with CDF
FGX (x) ≈
γ(α, x
λ
)
Γ (α)
, (39)
where the shape parameters α and λ are given in terms of the
κ-µ shadowed fading parameters as
α = µ, (40a)
λ =
γ
(1 + κ)µ
(
(m+ κµ)
m
mm
) 1
µ
. (40b)
Now, in order to asymptotically approximate Fγ1(γB), we use
the following relationship γ (a, x) ≃ xs/s as x → 0 in (39),
and then replacing γ → NBγB, µ → NBµB, m → NBmB,
and κ → κB. Next, by plugging the resulting asymptotic
Fγ1(γB) in (32), this yields
FB(γB) ≃
(
mNBmBB (1 + κB)
NBµB µNBµB−1B γ
NBµB
B
NBγ
NBµB
B (mB + κBµB)
NBmB Γ (NBµB)
)NA
.
(41)
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Substituting (41) with [26, Eq. (4)] with the respective
substitutions into (18), it follows that
SOP∞ ≃
(
mNBmBB (1 + κB)
NBµB µNBµB−1B τ
NBµB
NBγ
NBµB
B (mB + κBµB)
NBmB Γ (NBµB)
)NA
× µ
NEµE
E m
NEmE
E (1 + κE)
NEµE
Γ (NEµE) γ
NEµE
E (µEκE +mE)
NEmE
×
∫ ∞
0
γNEµE+NANBµB−1E exp
(
−γEµE (1 + κE)
γE
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
× 1F1
(
NEmE, NEµE,
γEκEµ
2
E (1 + κE)
γE (mE + κEµE)
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
.
(42)
Finally, [35, Eq. (7.522.9)]
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
• If mi < µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Inserting (12) in (28), the result is
C¯B =
1
ln 2
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h+1
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !
×

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z


pq
×
∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
×
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z
)st] ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
γEk
∆B
2
)
(1+γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
× exp
(
−γE
(
h−k
∆B
1
))
γ
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
.
(43)
Employing [35, Eq. (3.353.5)], the integral in I5 can be ex-
pressed in simple exact closed-form. Then, by substituting (12)
together with (10b) into (29), it follows that
L (γB, γE) =
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h+1
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !
×

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z


pq
× 1
ln 2
∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
×
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z
)st]( ηE∑
j=1
AE1,j
ηE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
×
(
1
∆E1
)r ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−γE
(
h−k
∆B
1
+ k
∆B
2
+ 1
∆E
1
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
× 1
(1 + γE)
γ
r+
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
+
νE∑
j=1
AE2,j
νE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
1
∆E2
)r ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− γE
∆E2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
× exp
(
−γE
(
h− k
∆B1
+
k
∆B2
))
1
(1 + γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
× γr+
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
.
)
(44)
Again, by using [35, Eq. (3.353.5)], both I6 and I7 can be
evaluated en closed-form fashion. Then, by combining (43)
and (44), the C¯S can be expressed as in (23). This completes
the proof.
• If mi ≥ µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Plugging (13) in (28), we have
C¯B =
1
ln 2
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h+1
(
NA
h
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
×
∫ ∞
0
1
(1 + γE)
exp
(
−γE
(
h
∆B
2
))
γ
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
.
(45)
With the aid of [35, Eq. (3.353.5)], I7 can be evaluated in exact
closed-form expression. Next, by inserting (11b) and (13)
13
into (29), this yields
L (γB, γE) =
1
ln 2
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h+1
(
NA
h
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
×
βE∑
j=0
BEj
νE−j−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
1
∆E2
)r ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− γE
∆E2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I8
× 1
(1 + γE)
exp
(
−γEh
∆B2
)
γ
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st+r
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I8
.
(46)
Similar to evaluate I7, the identity [35, Eq. (3.353.5)] is used
to calculate I8. Finally, by combining (45) and (46), the C¯S
can be formulated as in (22), which concludes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
• If mi < µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Inserting (10b) in (31), this yields
C¯E =
1
ln 2
(
ηE∑
j=1
AE1,j
ηE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
1
∆E1
)r ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− γE
∆E1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I9
× γ
r
E
(1 + γE)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I9
+
νE∑
j=1
AE2,j
νE−j∑
r=0
1
r!
(
1
∆E2
)r
×
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− γE
∆E2
)
γrE
(1 + γE)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I10
.
)
(47)
Recalling [35, Eq. (3.353.5)], integrals I9 and I10 can be
computed in exact-closed fashion. Hence, an approximation
of C¯
γB→∞
B can be formulated as in [38] by
C¯
γ
B
→∞
B ≈ log2(γT) + log2(e)
dM(n)
dn
∣∣∣∣
n=0
, (48)
where γT = NBγB is the total average SNR at Bob, and
M(n) , E[γnB]
γn
B
denotes the normalized moments of the RV
γB. From (14), M(n) can be expressed as
M(n) = 1
γnB
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) h∑
k=0
(
k
h
) ∑
ρ(k,νB)
k!
p1! · · · pνB !
×

 νB∏
q=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−q
(νB − q)!
νB∑
z=νB+1−q
AB2,νB+1−z


pq
×
∑
ρ(h−k,ηB)
(h− k)!
s1! · · · sηB !

 ηB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
1
)ηB−t
(ηB − t)!
×
ηB∑
z=ηB+1−t
AB1,ηB+1−z
)st]∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−γB
(
h−k
∆B
1
))
∆B
1
∆B
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
× exp
(
− γBk
∆B
2
)
γ
−1+n+
∑ηB
t=1(ηB−t)st+
∑νB
q=1(νB−q)pq
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
×
(
∆B1∆
B
2
(
ηB∑
t=1
(ηB − t)st +
νB∑
q=1
(νB − q)pq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
−γB
(
∆B1 k −∆B2 (k − h)
)
dγB︸ ︷︷ ︸
I11
)
. (49)
Expanding the integral term in (49) and making use of [35,
Eq. (3.351.3)], I11 can be evaluated in a simple form. Next,
taking the derivative of the the resulting expression with
respect to n, and setting n equal to zero, C¯
γB→∞
B can
be formulated in closed-form fashion. Finally, by replacing
C¯
γ
B
→∞
B and (47) into (30), and after some manipulations,
C¯∞S is attained as in (24). This completes the proof.
• If mi ≥ µi for i ∈ {B,E}
Substituting (11b) into (31), we obtain
C¯E =
1
ln 2
βE∑
j=0
BEj
νE−j−1∑
r=0
1
r!
(
1
∆E2
)r ∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− γE
∆E2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I12
× γ
r
E
(1 + γE)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I12
. (50)
Again, making use of [35, Eq. (3.353.5)], I12 is computed in
a closed-form solution. Here, following similar steps to obtain
C¯
γB→∞
B as in the previous case, we substitute (15) intoM(n),
14
we get
M(n) = 1
γnB
NA∑
h=1
(−1)h
(
NA
h
) ∑
ρ(h,νB)
h!
s1! · · · sνB !
×

 νB∏
t=1


(
1
∆B
2
)νB−t
(νB − t)!
βB∑
z=βB+1−T (j−1)
BBβB−z


st
× 1
∆B2
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−hγB
∆B2
)
γ
−1+n+
∑νB
t=1(νB−t)st
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
I13
×
(
∆B2
νB∑
t=1
(νB − t)st − hγB
)
dγB︸ ︷︷ ︸
I13
. (51)
Performing the integral term in (51) and recalling the iden-
tity [35, Eq. (3.351.3)], I13 is obtained in closed-form expres-
sion. Next, by plugging (51) in (48), then taking the derivative
with respect to n, and setting n = 0, C¯
γ
B
→∞
B is attained in
closed-from formulation. Finally, by substituting the C¯
γB→∞
B
together with (50), and after some algebra, C¯∞S is expressed
as in (25). This completes the proof.
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